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This Essay considers when, exactly, a plaintiff, defendant, or course of
conduct is deemed “foreign” for the purpose of different procedural
doctrines. By considering the meaning and relevance of “foreignness”
in the context of personal jurisdiction, diversity jurisdiction, forum non
conveniens, and the presumption against extraterritoriality, the Essay
underscores how the concept of foreignness is neither self-explanatory
nor a simple binary distinction. The complexity of foreignness should in
turn challenge judges, litigants, and observers to question what
rhetorical work the concept of “foreignness” may be doing in judicial
reasoning. The goal is thus two-fold: to encourage more precise
invocations of foreignness when it is indeed relevant for particular
procedural doctrines, and to caution against the rhetorical use of
“foreignness” as a short-hand for dismissing, or dismissively treating,
cases in U.S. courts.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. For thoughtful comments and conserva-
tions, I would like to thank Pam Bookman, Kevin Clermont, John Coyle, William Dodge, Nora
Engstrom, Stephan Landsman, Stephen Sachs, Aaron Simowitz, and Chris Whytock, as well as
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and the Private International Law Roundtable at the University of North Carolina School of
Law.
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INTRODUCTION
What does it mean for a case to be “foreign-cubed”? More specifi-
cally, when is a plaintiff, defendant, or course of conduct “foreign”?
The answer is not as straightforward as it may initially appear. Differ-
ent doctrines draw the line differently when it comes to legal perma-
nent residents, interrelated corporate entities, or conduct that occurs
across multiple countries (or perhaps—in cases involving international
waters or Bitcoin transactions—in no country). By considering the
meaning and relevance of “foreignness” across procedural doctrines,
this Essay underscores how the concept of foreignness is not a simple
binary distinction. Rather, what counts as “foreign” depends on the
question being asked, with the line between “here” and “there” vary-
ing depending on the doctrine and the context.
The complexity of foreignness should in turn challenge judges, liti-
gants, and observers to question what rhetorical work the concept of
“foreignness” is doing in judicial reasoning. The concept of foreign-
ness, particularly when unmoored from specific doctrines, is not self-
explanatory. Labels like “foreign-cubed,” I want to suggest, are not
objective determinations as much as a trope that signals the author’s
gestalt conception of a case. The goal of this Essay is thus two-fold: to
map some of the different meanings of “foreignness” in procedure in
order to highlight its variability and encourage its precise invocation,
and to caution against the rhetorical use of “foreignness” as a short-
hand for dismissing, or dismissively treating, cases in U.S. courts.
I. FOREIGNNESS IN PROCEDURE
A number of procedural doctrines ask judges to consider whether a
party or course of conduct is “foreign.” This Part draws out the role of
“foreignness” in the federal court treatment of forum non conveniens,
personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, and the presumption
against extraterritoriality, particularly as it is applied to the Alien Tort
Statute (ATS).1
A. Forum Non Conveniens
Since the adoption of 28 U.S.C. § 1404, federal judges invoke forum
non conveniens primarily to dismiss cases they believe are more prop-
erly heard in a foreign court. The Supreme Court ratified this practice
1. This is not an exhaustive list of doctrines that invoke foreignness. Others include abstention
in transnational cases (sometimes called international comity abstention), dormant foreign af-
fairs preemption, limits on foreign sovereign immunity, and the federal venue statute (28 U.S.C.
§ 1391).
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in its 1981 decision Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno.2 In doing so, the
Court explicitly baked “foreignness” into the forum non conveniens
analysis. Although the Supreme Court acknowledged “that there is
ordinarily a strong presumption in favor of the plaintiff’s choice of
forum,” the Court concluded that “the presumption applies with less
force when the plaintiff or real parties in interest are foreign.”3 The
Court justified this differential treatment based on the assumption
that a plaintiff’s “home forum” is a “convenient” location for the suit.4
By choosing to forego the convenience of suing close to home, the
Court assumed, the plaintiff must be pursuing an illegitimate forum
shopping motive.5 Thus “a foreign plaintiff’s choice [of forum] de-
serves less deference.”6
There is much to critique in this reasoning. Most significantly, there
can be perfectly valid reasons—including jurisdictional necessity—
that may compel a plaintiff to accept the inconvenience of suing in a
foreign forum. And in practice, as we shall see, the different treatment
of plaintiffs depending on their “foreignness” introduces unnecessary
complications into an analysis that is already highly discretionary.7
B. Personal Jurisdiction
It has not been lost on commentators that the most difficult and
consequential personal jurisdiction cases before the Supreme Court in
recent years have involved foreign defendants.8 In particular, the
Court’s refinement of general personal jurisdiction has a significant
impact on foreign defendants, particularly corporate defendants.9 Af-
ter Goodyear v. Brown and Daimler v. Bauman, a defendant is only
subject to general jurisdiction where it is “at home.”10 For individual
defendants, that is their domicile; for a corporation, that is their place
of incorporation or principal place of business.11 As a general matter,
2. 454 U.S. 235, 251 (1981).




7. See infra Part II.A (discussing the difficulty of defining “foreign” plaintiffs for purposes of
forum non conveniens).
8. See, e.g., William S. Dodge & Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aliens, 116 MICH. L.
REV. 1205, 1206 (2018).
9. See id. at 1207.
10. 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011); 134 S. Ct. 746, 751, 760 (2014).
11. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760.
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corporations organized and based in other countries are thus no
longer subject to general personal jurisdiction in the United States.12
The same is not necessarily true for individual defendants who are
foreign citizens. Foreign citizens who are domiciled in the United
States would still seem to be subject to general jurisdiction, as would
foreign domiciliaries who are served in person while in the United
States.13 While judges and commentators have noted that the reason-
ing of Daimler casts doubt on the continuing constitutionality of such
transient (or “tag”) jurisdiction, today it appears that foreign individu-
als doing business in the United States are more likely to be subject to
general personal jurisdiction in U.S. courts than are foreign incorpo-
rated businesses.14
Foreignness also appears to matter for the determination of specific
personal jurisdiction, which requires both a finding of minimum con-
tacts on the part of the defendant and a determination that exercising
jurisdiction based on those contacts would be constitutionally reason-
able.15 Regarding the reasonableness determination, Asahi Metal In-
dustries Co. v. Superior Court explicitly linked that analysis to a
defendant’s foreignness.16 “The unique burdens placed upon one who
must defend oneself in a foreign legal system,” the Court explained,
“should have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of
stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national bor-
ders.”17 Nonetheless, the Court hedged that “often the interests of the
plaintiff and the forum in the exercise of jurisdiction will justify even
the serious burdens placed on the alien defendant.”18 Thus the for-
eignness of the defendant may matter, but it matters less if the plain-
tiff (or the case as a whole) feels sufficiently domestic to override
concerns for the burdened defendant.19
12. For an important possible exception, see Linda J. Silberman & Aaron D. Simowitz, Recog-
nition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and Awards: What Hath Daimler Wrought?, 91
N.Y.U. L. REV. 344, 383 (2016) (arguing for a different analysis in the judgment enforcement
context).
13. E.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 247 (2d Cir. 1995).
14. See, e.g., Jamarillo v. Naranjo, No. 10-21951-CIV, 2014 WL 4898210, at *4–5 (S.D. Fla.
Sept. 30, 2014) (questioning the constitutionality of tag jurisdiction as applied to foreign defend-
ants after Daimler, but nonetheless concluding that a foreign citizen serving a U.S. prison sen-
tence was subject to general personal jurisdiction based on personal service).
15. See Dodge & Dodson, supra note 8, at 1212–17.
16. 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Tellez v. Madigral, EP-15-CV-304-KC, 2016 WL 11121114, at *10 (W.D. Tex.
Sept. 16, 2016) (where both the plaintiff and the defendant were Mexican citizens but the plain-
tiff resided in Texas, finding that the burden on the defendant was outweighed by the plaintiff’s
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The relevance of foreignness is not as explicit in the minimum con-
tacts analysis, but the Court in J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro em-
phasized the defendant’s foreignness and its use of an independent
U.S. distributor to manage the marketing and sales of its products in
the United States.20 Commentators have worried that Nicastro pro-
vides foreign companies with a roadmap for avoiding personal juris-
diction in any particular U.S. state.21 Because both Nicastro and Asahi
lacked a majority decision regarding the minimum contacts analysis,
however, it is not clear that either case has worked a substantial nar-
rowing of specific personal jurisdiction, including when it comes to
foreign defendants.22
C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Some grants of subject matter jurisdiction to the federal courts turn
on the foreign status of a party. Article III extends federal judicial
authority, for example, to “Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls” as well as to “Controversies . . . between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Sub-
jects.”23 Accordingly, the diversity statute grants the federal courts au-
thority to hear civil actions between “citizens of a State and citizens or
subjects of a foreign state,” between “citizens of different States and
in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties,”
and between “a foreign state . . . as plaintiff and citizens of a State or
of different States.”24 More specific grants of subject matter jurisdic-
tion also include requirements of foreignness.25 Most famously, the
ATS grants original jurisdiction to the district courts over “any civil
interest in suing close to home and the state’s interest in providing a forum for its residents to
seek redress for “injuries inflicted by out-of-state defendants”).
20. 564 U.S. 873, 878 (2011).
21. See, e.g., Dodge & Dodson, supra note 8, at 1228; see also id. at 1228 n.149 (gathering
commentators).
22. See Plixer Int’l, Inc. v. Scrutinizer GmbH, 905 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2018) (holding that
Breyer’s concurrence in Nicastro controls, specifically his statement that the case required no
change in personal jurisdiction law, and gathering similar opinions from the Fifth, Federal, and
D.C. Circuits). See infra Part II.B (further exploring the effect of foreignness on minimum con-
tacts analysis).
23. U.S. CONST. art. III.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2)–(4) (2018).
25. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1351 (2012) (“Consuls, vice consuls, and members of a diplomatic
mission as defendant”) (incorporating definition of “family” for members of diplomatic missions
that excludes “nationals of the United States” and, under some circumstances, legal permanent
residents as well); 28 U.S.C. § 1364 (2012) (“Direct actions against insurers of members of diplo-
matic missions and their families”) (same).
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action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.”26
D. Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
The modern presumption against extraterritoriality incorporates
foreignness both in rationale and in application. The presumption is
justified in part by the “commonsense notion that Congress generally
legislates with domestic concerns in mind.”27 The distinction is binary,
dividing U.S. territory from everywhere else: In the context of the pre-
sumption, “extraterritorial” includes spaces that are not “foreign” in
that they do not belong to another country, like international waters
and Antarctica.28
In Morrison v. National Australian Bank and RJR Nabisco, Inc. v.
European Community, the Supreme Court articulated a two-step
framework for applying the presumption.29 At the first step, the court
looks for a “clear indication” from Congress that the statute should
have extraterritorial effect.30 If it finds none, the court continues to
the second step, which requires determining the “focus” of the stat-
ute.31 The court must then determine whether that “focus” is alleged
(or established, depending on the stage of proceedings) to have oc-
curred within the United States, in which case the non-extraterritorial
statute is permissibly applied domestically.32 If the “focus” instead oc-
curred outside the United States, the non-extraterritorial statute does
not provide relief for the plaintiff’s claim.33 The two-step analysis,
then, requires an evaluation of both Congress’s extraterritorial intent
and the geographic location of the statute’s focus in a particular
case.34
In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the Court concluded that
the ATS does not rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality.35
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (emphasis added).
27. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Eur. Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016) (quoting Smith v. United
States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993)).
28. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 121 (2013) (“This Court has
generally treated the high seas the same as foreign soil for purposes of the presumption against
extraterritorial application.” (citing Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 173–74
(1993)); see also Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 (1993) (similar in regards to
Antarctica).
29. 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010); 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016).
30. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101.
31. Id.
32. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 569 U.S. 108, 124 (2013).
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It thus affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ suit because “all the
relevant conduct took place outside the United States.”36 The Court
then continued, “even where the claims touch and concern the terri-
tory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to dis-
place the presumption against extraterritorial application.”37 This
language was purposefully vague, according to Justice Anthony Ken-
nedy’s concurrence.38 The circuit courts have split over whether Ki-
obel thus suggested a different, more flexible approach than Morrison
for evaluating whether an ATS claim is problematically foreign or ad-
equately domestic.39
Justices Samuel Alito and Clarence Thomas, however, would not
have been so vague: They would have applied Morrison’s “focus” test
to the ATS and concluded that “a putative ATS cause of action will
fall within the scope of the presumption against extraterritoriality—
and will therefore be barred—unless the domestic conduct is sufficient
to violate an international law norm”40 that satisfies the requirements
of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.41 Justice Alito also authored the Court’s
majority opinion the next time the presumption against extraterritori-
ality appeared before the Court.42 He used that opportunity in RJR
Nabisco to describe Kiobel as reflecting Morrison’s two-step frame-
work.43 The only reason Kiobel had not explicitly invoked Morrison’s
focus test, he asserted, was because the parties in Kiobel did not assert
any domestic conduct.44
This seems to be a point of disagreement between the Justices. Jus-
tice Kennedy, in authoring the next ATS case to appear before the
Court, cited Kiobel’s “touch and concern” standard and notably did
not refer to Morrison’s focus test.45 Whether Morrison’s focus test ap-
plies to the ATS—that is, how the “foreignness” of conduct underly-
ing an ATS claim is to be determined—remains an open question.46
36. Id. at 124.
37. Id. at 124–25 (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 125 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
39. See Vasundhara Prasad, The Road Beyond Kiobel: The Fifth Circuit’s Decision in Adhikari
v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc. and Its Implications for the Alien Tort Statute, 59 B.C. L. REV. E.
SUPP. 369, 370–71 (2018).
40. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 126–27 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
41. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004).
42. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Eur. Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2096 (2016).
43. Id. at 2101.
44. Id.
45. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1406 (2018).
46. See infra Part II.C for further discussion of this question.
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II. THE VARIABILITY OF FOREIGNNESS
This Part considers, in turn, what it means for a plaintiff, defendant,
or course of conduct to be foreign in the relevant sense under these
different doctrines. The goal is partly doctrinal clarification insofar as
there is a risk that different applications of foreignness can be con-
flated. But this Part also aims to undermine the sense of “foreignness”
as a stable and self-explanatory concept. Once different uses of “for-
eignness” are juxtaposed, it is easier to see slippage between those
uses. In addition to promoting correct application where the meaning
of “foreign” is stable, then, this Part also aims to prompt caution or
reform where it is not.
A. Plaintiffs
What makes a plaintiff “foreign”—her citizenship or her residence?
The answer depends on the procedural question being asked.
Subject matter jurisdiction typically turns on citizenship, given Arti-
cle III’s reference to “Citizens or Subjects” of “foreign States” (lan-
guage that is echoed in the diversity statute).47 But the diversity
statute replaces citizenship with domicile in a particular circumstance:
In a dispute between foreign citizens and U.S. citizens, diversity juris-
diction is excluded if the foreign citizen is a legal permanent resident
domiciled in the same state as the U.S. citizen.48 Whether a foreigner’s
citizenship or domicile matters for diversity purposes thus turns on
whether the foreigner is a legal permanent resident and on who else is
involved in the suit.
The ATS more definitively links subject matter jurisdiction to citi-
zenship as it is limited to actions brought by “aliens.” ATS plaintiffs
thus may be (and often are) foreign citizens with legal permanent resi-
dence status in the United States—as were the plaintiffs in Kiobel.49
The Second Circuit has gone so far as to assume, without deciding,
that a U.S. citizen could bring an ATS claim as long as he or she was a
foreign citizen at the time of the alleged wrongdoing.50 An ATS plain-
47. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2018).
48. § 1332(a)(2). The statute does not, however, similarly except legal permanent residents in
§ 1332(a)(3), which establishes jurisdiction over actions between “citizens of different States and
in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties.” Thus, a New Yorker could
not sue in federal court a French citizen who is a legal permanent resident domiciled in New
York—unless perhaps he also sues another U.S. citizen from a different state. See 13E FED.
PRACTICE & PROC. JURIS. § 3604 (3d ed.).
49. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 113 (2013).
50. See Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 175 n.1 (2d Cir. 2014).
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tiff, in short, may be “foreign” in the sense relevant for the statute yet
have significant, even permanent, ties to the United States.
In contrast, “foreignness” for forum non conveniens turns on resi-
dence. In directing courts to give less deference to a “foreign” plain-
tiff’s choice of forum, the Piper Court did not specify whether the
foreign plaintiffs it had in mind were foreign citizens or foreign re-
sidents—the real plaintiffs-in-interest in Piper, after all, were both.51
But the Court justified its differential presumption by the inconve-
nience of litigating far from home.52 Regardless of the flaws in that
reasoning, whether the plaintiff lives in close proximity to the chosen
forum is a question of residence, not citizenship. Federal courts have
recognized this connection in both directions: U.S. citizens who reside
abroad but sue in the United States are “foreign” in the relevant sense
and should receive less deference for their forum choice.53 Con-
versely, foreign citizens with legal permanent residence or asylum sta-
tus in the United States should receive the stronger presumption of
deference for suing in their “home” district.54
Yet even when judges recognize that the stronger presumption
should apply to legal permanent residents, they may nonetheless dis-
count the plaintiffs’ interests in suing in a U.S. forum. That is, such
plaintiffs are still discounted as “foreign,” even if they are locals in the
doctrinal sense. In Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., the
Eleventh Circuit dismissed an ATS and Torture Victim Protection Act
(TVPA) case brought by Guatemalan labor leaders who accused the
defendants of complicity in their torture.55 The plaintiffs had been
granted asylum in the United States based on the same incidents.56 As
U.S. residents, then, they were entitled to full deference for their
choice of forum. The Eleventh Circuit did not say it was applying the
weakened presumption, but it stressed the plaintiffs’ outsider status by
twice calling out the plaintiffs’ “forum shopping”;57 by emphasizing
that “all of the individuals involved [in the case] were (at least at the
time) Guatemalan citizens . . .”;58 and by agreeing with the district
court’s observation that the case would “impose[ ] an inappropriately
51. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 73 n.5 (2d Cir. 2001) (en banc).
54. See, e.g., Palacios v. The Coca-Cola Co., 757 F. Supp. 2d 347, 352–53 (S.D.N.Y. 2010),
aff’d, 499 F. App’x 54, 57 (2d Cir. 2012).
55. 578 F.3d 1283, 1286 (11th Cir. 2009).
56. Id. at 1287.
57. See id. at 1298–99 (quoting twice the district court’s concern about “preventing forum
shopping”).
58. Id. (emphasis added).
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heavy burden on this Court and this community” given the presumed
lack of local interest in the matter.59
Even though the Aldana plaintiffs were local in the relevant sense,
then, their foreignness seems to have colored the district court’s and
the circuit court majority’s forum non conveniens analysis. As the dis-
sent in Aldana summarized, “[I]t is perfectly reasonable for Plaintiffs
to have brought this lawsuit in the court of the country of their resi-
dence, particularly because United States’ law governs their claims
and one of the Defendants, Del Monte, is incorporated and located in
the United States.”60 Nor can the majority’s characterization of Al-
dana as impermissibly foreign be explained instead by the foreign lo-
cation of the alleged wrongdoing. In a similar case—alleging tortious
conduct in a foreign country that involved a mix of U.S. and foreign
defendants—the same district court declined to dismiss the case for
forum non conveniens.61 The primary difference in Klyszcz v.
Cloward H2O LLC was that the case was brought by U.S. citizens.62
To take another example, the Southern District of New York ap-
plied no deference to a plaintiff’s choice of forum even though the
plaintiff was a U.S. citizen living in New York.63 The court justified
that lack of deference based on the plaintiff’s choice to invest in for-
eign assets.64 It also discounted the U.S. status of the other named
plaintiff, a Delaware limited liability company, because it was a
“shell” company “not entitled to the full measure of ‘home forum’
deference.”65 A likely greater determinant, however, was a sense that
the plaintiff was still foreign in a meaningful way. Tellingly, the opin-
ion initially introduces the plaintiff (a U.S. citizen) as “a Russian na-
tional now living in New York.”66
59. Id. at 1298.
60. Id. at 1305.
61. Klyszcz v. Cloward H2O LLC, No. 11-23023-Civ., 2012 WL 4468345, at *6 & n.3 (S.D. Fla.
Sept. 26, 2012).
62. Id. Neither the Klyszcz nor the Aldana plaintiffs lived in Florida. Courts are divided as to
whether U.S. citizens are still considered not-foreign when they sue in a different state, but the
better view is that they should be. See Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 73 n.5 (2d Cir.
2001) (en banc); Reid-Walen v. Hansen, 933 F.2d 1390, 1394 (8th Cir. 1991). If so, legal perma-
nent residents should also be considered not-foreign when they sue in a state other than the state
of their domicile. See Palacios v. The Coca-Cola Co., 757 F. Supp. 2d 347, 352, 352 n.3 (S.D.N.Y.
2010), aff’d, 499 F. App’x 54, 54 (2d Cir. 2012) (recognizing in light of Second Circuit precedent
on forum non conveniens that any U.S. forum is a “home forum” for legal permanent residents).
63. RIGroups LLC v. Trefonisco Mgmt. Ltd., 949 F. Supp. 2d 546, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 552.
66. Id. at 548. The opinion does later note that the plaintiff “is now a naturalized United
States citizen living in New York City,” id. at 549, and a few pages further on notes her “status as
an American citizen,” only to conclude that this status “warrants limited, or perhaps even no
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In short, the courts’ perceptions of the plaintiffs’ foreignness in
these cases affected the forum non conveniens analysis in a way that
does not align with the convenience rationale of Piper’s differential
presumption. The plaintiffs’ perceived “foreignness,” in other words,
altered the legitimacy of their status as litigants even if they were su-
ing in presumptively convenient forums.
Making things more complicated, forum non conveniens motions
are often raised in ATS cases. That requires judges to consider
whether plaintiffs who are foreign for ATS jurisdictional purposes
(i.e., non-U.S. citizens) may nonetheless be not-foreign for purposes
of Piper’s differential presumption (i.e., U.S. residents). The attendant
risk of conflation could explain why the Eleventh Circuit in Aldana
treated the U.S. resident plaintiffs as nonetheless foreign in its forum
non conveniens analysis. The distinction also helps to answer a ques-
tion that Justice Alito raised in his concurrence in Jesner v. Arab
Bank, PLC.67 Justice Alito wondered why an ATS plaintiff would not
simply use the diversity statute to sue a U.S. corporation,68 perhaps on
the assumption that any ATS claim would meet the diversity statute’s
amount in controversy requirement. But the section of the diversity
statute to which Justice Alito referred explicitly treats legal permanent
residents as equivalent to state citizens for diversity purposes.69 An
asylum grantee living in New York City, for example, cannot invoke
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) to sue in federal court a U.S. corporation that
is either incorporated in New York or has its principal place of busi-
ness there: Both the plaintiff and the defendant would be considered
New York “citizens” under the diversity statute. In focusing on the
necessary “foreignness” of ATS plaintiffs, it can be easy to miss that
they may well be not-foreign for other purposes.
Even if judges focus on the correct characteristic, how are they to
characterize groups of plaintiffs with mixed status? Here again the
doctrines differ. For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, the question is
one of statutory interpretation. The addition of one foreign citizen
plaintiff defeats subject matter jurisdiction if all the defendants are
foreign citizens, regardless of the number of U.S. citizen plaintiffs also
joined.70 But if all U.S. citizen plaintiffs and defendants are diverse
deference, as the Complaint alleges injuries only to” the Delaware limited liability company (the
same one that the court had discounted as merely a “shell” company), id. at 552.
67. 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1410 (2018) (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
68. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (2018)).
69. See § 1332(a)(2).
70. See, e.g., Universal Licensing Corp. v. Paola del Lungo, S.p.A., 293 F.3d 579, 581 (2d Cir.
2002) (“[D]iversity is lacking within the meaning of these sections . . . where on one side there
are citizens and aliens and on the opposite side there are only aliens.”).
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(e.g., two New Yorkers suing two Californians), it does not matter
how many foreign citizen plaintiffs are added.71 The lines are clear,
even if they feel somewhat arbitrary.
In contrast, the line for forum non conveniens’ differential pre-
sumption is less definite. In Vivendi SA v. T-Mobile USA Inc., the
Ninth Circuit concluded that a belatedly added U.S. plaintiff was in-
sufficient to change the level of deference given to a foreign corpora-
tion’s choice of U.S. forum.72 But in Carijano v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., the Ninth Circuit clarified that “the strong presumption in
favor of the domestic plaintiff’s choice of forum” is not lessened
“when both domestic and foreign plaintiffs are present.”73 The
stronger presumption still applies, the court explained, even when a
single U.S. non-profit is joined as a plaintiff with twenty-five “foreign
plaintiffs.”74 The D.C. Circuit, meanwhile, has held that the strong
presumption applies when a third of the plaintiffs in a case are U.S.
citizens.75 In contrast, the Southern District of New York reduced the
strength of the presumption where “half of the named Plaintiffs con-
tinue to reside abroad.”76
The Southern District’s approach in this latter case reflects the Sec-
ond Circuit’s “sliding scale” solution to Piper’s differential presump-
tion.77 Given all of these possible permutations of foreignness, and
given the imperfect match between foreignness and illegitimate forum
shopping purposes,78 the Second Circuit has concluded that the defer-
ence due to a plaintiff’s choice of forum should be one of degree.79
“The more it appears that a domestic or foreign plaintiff’s choice of
forum has been dictated by reasons that the law recognizes as valid,
the greater the deference that will be given to the plaintiff’s forum
choice.”80 There is much to be said for eschewing the false dichotomy
suggested by Piper, yet the sliding scale approach has its own difficul-
71. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c).
72. 586 F.3d 689, 689, 694–95 (9th Cir. 2009).
73. 643 F.3d 1216, 1216, 1228 (9th Cir. 2011).
74. Id.
75. Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 911 F.3d 1172, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 2018). The opinion identi-
fies the citizenship of the plaintiffs, but not their residence. Id.
76. Palacios v. The Coca-Cola Co., 757 F. Supp. 2d 347, 353–54 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d, 499 F.
App’x 54, 54 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Harp v. Airblue Ltd., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1072, 1076 (C.D.
Cal. 2012) (applying the stronger presumption where one out of the five plaintiffs was a U.S.
citizen, but giving considerable weight to the foreign residency of the remaining plaintiffs when
evaluating private interests and accordingly dismissing the complaint for forum non conveniens).
77. Palacios, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 353–54, aff’d, 499 F. App’x at 54.
78. For example, is it illegitimate forum shopping for a foreign plaintiff to sue a U.S. defen-
dant in the defendant’s home district? See infra and text accompanying note 89. R
79. Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 2001) (en banc).
80. Id. at 71–72.
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ties.81 It certainly does not simplify the judge’s work; if anything, by
asking judges to consider factors like “the availability of witnesses or
evidence to the forum district” and “the inconvenience and expense to
the defendant resulting from litigation in that forum,” it moves up to
this threshold determination the ultimate weighing of private interests
on which the forum non conveniens analysis turns.82 A simpler ap-
proach would be to drop the differential presumption altogether. The
plaintiff’s choice of forum would then always receive strong defer-
ence, but the plaintiff’s lack of a real nexus to the forum or conve-
nience in litigating there would be addressed when weighing the
public and private interest factors.
B. Defendants
When it comes to defendants, it turns out that foreignness does not
matter as much as one might think—or where perhaps it should.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens, for example, does not ex-
plicitly distinguish between U.S. and foreign defendants, though I
have argued elsewhere that it should.83 Forum non conveniens is often
justified by its historical pedigree, yet traditionally forum non con-
veniens dismissals were limited to cases involving foreign defend-
ants.84 That limitation was rooted in the doctrine’s justifications as
either preventing grave injustice for defendants forced to litigate over
great distances85 or as ensuring that limited judicial resources served
local interests.86 Thus in 1945, for example, “a New York state court
refused to dismiss a case against a New York company even though it
involved more than a thousand Cuban plaintiffs suing under Cuban
law for unpaid wages in Cuba . . . given the well-established rule that
local defendants could not invoke forum non conveniens.”87
The contrary modern practice of federal courts is also in tension
with other doctrines, like the Supreme Court’s promise in Daimler
that general jurisdiction still leaves “plaintiffs recourse to at least one
81. See, e.g., Maggie Gardner, Parochial Procedure, 69 STAN. L. REV. 941, 991–92 (2017) (rais-
ing additional questions that complicate the application of the differential presumption); see also
id. at 992–93 (critiquing the sliding scale approach as requiring judges to evaluate forum shop-
ping motives, which is often a subjective inquiry).
82. Iragorri, 274 F.3d at 72.
83. Maggie Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 390, 453–54 (2017).
84. See id. at 415–16 (gathering historical examples).
85. Id. at 416 (describing Scottish and English practice, which informed the federal doctrine’s
private interest factors).
86. Id. at 415 (describing New York state’s forum non conveniens practice, which informed
the federal doctrine’s public interest factors).
87. Id. at 415–16 (describing Vigil v. Cayuga Constr. Corp., 54 N.Y.S.2d 94, 97–98 (N.Y. City
Ct. 1945)).
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clear and certain forum in which a corporate defendant may be sued
on any and all claims.”88 Indeed, a foreign plaintiff’s decision to sue a
U.S. corporation in its home jurisdiction would seem a proper forum
shopping consideration (or at least not an inherently illegitimate one)
that is not captured by Piper’s binary distinction between foreign and
U.S. plaintiffs.89 Forum non conveniens, in short, is a doctrine where
courts should distinguish more clearly between U.S. and foreign de-
fendants (based, as with plaintiffs, on the defendant’s domicile).
With the ATS, the circuits are split over whether a defendant’s U.S.
citizenship or domicile should cut in favor of jurisdiction.90 Kiobel did
not settle this question, as the defendants there were foreign corpora-
tions with “mere corporate presence” in the United States.91 That left
the door open for later plaintiffs to argue that a defendant’s greater
connection with the United States should alter the analysis.92 Foreign-
ness (or the lack thereof) does seem relevant here: The presence of a
U.S. defendant increases the nexus to the United States while amelio-
rating concerns about international comity.93
While it is unsettled how much a defendant’s U.S. citizenship should
count towards the existence of subject matter jurisdiction over an ATS
case,94 the Supreme Court recently held that the foreign citizenship of
88. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014); see also Gardner, supra note 83, at
453–54.
89. Compare Del Istmo Assurance Corp. v. Platon, No. 11-61599-CIV, 2011 WL 5508641, at
*1–2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 9, 2011) (applying weakened presumption even though foreign corporation
sued U.S. defendants in their home forum), with Reid-Walen v. Hansen, 933 F.2d 1390, 1395 (8th
Cir. 1991) (noting that forum non conveniens dismissals should be disfavored when a U.S. defen-
dant is sued in its home forum). See also Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 73 (2d. Cir.
2001) (en banc) (noting relevance of this circumstance in adopting sliding scale approach).
90. See Edward T. Swaine, Kiobel and Extraterritoriality: Here, (Not) There, (Not Even) Eve-
rywhere, 69 OKLA. L. REV. 23, 45–46 (2016) (gathering cases). The question here is not whether
the ATS is limited to suits against U.S. defendants, but whether a suit brought against a U.S.
defendant “touches and concerns” the United States more than does a suit brought against a
foreign defendant. Justice Gorsuch, in contrast, has argued that the ATS only allows suits
brought against U.S. defendants. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1414–17 (2018)
(opinion of Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
91. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 125 (2013). One might ask, however,
what constitutes “mere corporate presence,” as compared to extensive business activity that pur-
posefully benefits from access to U.S. laws and markets.
92. Cf. id. at 133 (opinion of Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (asserting that the ATS
provides jurisdiction where “the defendant is an American national”).
93. Accord, e.g., Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 530 (4th Cir. 2014);
Doug Cassel, Suing Americans for Human Rights Torts Overseas: The Supreme Court Leaves the
Door Open, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1773, 1775–76 (2014); Prasad, supra note 39, at 390.
94. Compare Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 530 (U.S. citizenship of defendant is relevant), and Doe
v. Drummond Co., Inc., 782 F.3d 576, 595 (11th Cir. 2015) (U.S. citizenship of defendant relevant
but not sufficient), with Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 188–89 (2d Cir. 2014) (U.S.
citizenship of defendants is irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes).
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a corporation bars suits against that corporation under the ATS.95 Af-
ter Jesner, the foreign citizenship of ATS defendants does matter, but
only if the defendant is a corporation. A similar divide in the treat-
ment of foreign corporations and foreign individuals occurs with gen-
eral personal jurisdiction, given that only foreign individuals are
subject to tag jurisdiction in the United States.96 Thus, a foreign citi-
zen domiciled in another country who passes through the United
States is more at risk of being subjected to general personal jurisdic-
tion in a U.S. court than is a foreign corporation that does continuous
and systematic business here but has its principal place of business
elsewhere.
That distinction, of course, largely aligns with how individuals and
corporations with U.S. citizenship are treated. Indeed, personal juris-
diction doctrines—whether general or specific—do not really distin-
guish between U.S. and foreign defendants.97 This parallel treatment
remains true even after Nicastro, which seemed to suggest that foreign
manufacturers could avoid specific personal jurisdiction in the United
States by selling their products to an independent U.S. distributor.98
Because the courts of appeal have largely agreed that Nicastro’s frac-
tured opinions did not alter existing personal jurisdiction law,99 the
lower courts have continued to apply stream-of-commerce reasoning
to foreign corporations just as they would to domestic ones. Even if a
national border exists between a foreign manufacturer and a fully in-
dependent U.S. distributor, in other words, the foreign manufacturer
may still be subject to specific personal jurisdiction if it knew or
should have known of sales in a particular U.S. state. If the plaintiff
can demonstrate more than isolated sales within the forum, knowl-
edge and thus purposeful availment can be inferred back up the
chain.100
Thus a Chinese corporation that did not ship products to Illinois
and “was indifferent as to where its products were sold in the United
States” nonetheless had minimum contacts with Illinois given that
95. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1403 (2018).
96. See supra Part I.B.
97. For arguments that different tests should apply, see Dodge & Dodson, supra note 8, at
1208–11; Linda J. Silberman & Nathan D. Yaffe, The Transnational Case in Conflict of Laws:
Two Suggestions for the New Restatement Third of Conflict of Laws, 27 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L
L. 405 (2017).
98. Cf. Dodge & Dodson, supra note 8, at 1216 (“[T]he justices in McIntyre appeared willing
to recognize the unique influences of a defendant’s alienage status, but no position commanded
a majority.”).
99. See supra note 22. R
100. See Silberman & Yaffe, supra note 97, at 415 n.31 (noting that the lower courts have
largely distinguished Nicastro on this basis).
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third parties had sold 28,000 units of the allegedly defective product in
the state.101 A Taiwanese corporation had minimum contacts with
Minnesota even though it sold its lithium batteries to two distributors
in California and Massachusetts, given that one of those distributors
had twenty-six customers in Minnesota, including the insured’s com-
pany.102 And a Swedish designer of a heated seat integrated by the
third-party plaintiffs into a skid loader had minimum contacts with
Texas even though the Swedish defendant did not have specific knowl-
edge of the roughly 1,200 skid loaders sold in Texas—given that
“Texas is a major market for industrial, farm, and construction equip-
ment.”103 In short, Nicastro seems readily distinguishable as long as
the plaintiff can point to actual (and more than sporadic) sales in the
state.104
This focus on in-state sales has also limited the ability of multina-
tional enterprises to manage their U.S. contacts by separately incorpo-
rating their manufacturing and distributing operations in different
countries. Applying Federal Circuit law to patent infringement suits,
for example, district courts have invoked stream-of-commerce theory
to reach foreign manufacturers who rely on related U.S. corporations
to distribute the infringing product in the United States.105 Thus the
Northern District of Texas found minimum contacts established when
a foreign parent “transfers title of the accused products [overseas] to
an American corporation that [the parent] created for the purpose of
distributing and selling its products in the United States.”106 “As the
fourth largest provider of mobile devices sold in the United States,”
the court reasoned, the foreign parent corporation “must be reasona-
bly aware that products delivered to [its U.S. subsidiary] are in fact
101. Hubert v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC, No. 15-cv-0047-MJR-SCW, 2016 WL 4132077
(S.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 2016).
102. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. BMC USA Corp., No. 16-1793, 2017 WL 4325693 (D.
Minn. Sept. 27, 2017).
103. Stephenson v. Caterpillar, No. 2:16-CV-00071-JRG-RSP, 2018 WL 6038359, at *3 (E.D.
Tex. Oct. 30, 2018).
104. For an example of a case where lack of evidence of in-state sales seems to have doomed
the plaintiff’s effort to assert specific personal jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer, see
Dreibelbeis v. Daesung Celtic Enersys Co., Ltd., No. 3:17-CV-100-JD, 2018 WL 3141850, at *4
(N.D. Ind. June 27, 2018).
105. For an additional example, beyond those discussed here, see FOX Factory, Inc., v.
SRAM, LLC, 3:16-cv-03716-WHO, 2017 WL 4551486, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2017) (asserting
personal jurisdiction over a foreign subsidiary that “manufacture[d] the accused products in Tai-
wan and transfer[red] them to [the U.S. parent], which s[old] the products to distributors such as
Giant Bicycle that have a facility in California,” such that “[t]he products [we]re eventually sold
to California consumers at dozens of retail locations”).
106. Seven Networks, LLC v. ZTE (USA), Inc., No. 3:17-cv-1495-M, 2018 WL 2427147, at *3
(N.D. Tex. May 30, 2018).
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being sold in the United States,” including the Northern District of
Texas where the U.S. subsidiary had its principal place of business.107
To take a more complicated relationship between a foreign parent
and a U.S. subsidiary, the Northern District of Illinois asserted per-
sonal jurisdiction over a foreign holding company that did not manu-
facture, import, or distribute the infringing product.108 The product
was instead manufactured by an unrelated Chinese defendant and
sold initially to a Hong Kong subsidiary that imported the products to
California.109 There the title passed to a U.S. subsidiary that then sold
the infringing products to Home Depot, with which the U.S. subsidi-
ary had an exclusive retail agreement.110 Despite this lengthy (and
slightly removed) chain of distribution, the court found that the for-
eign parent corporation had minimum contacts with Illinois because
it:
[A]pproved and allocated capital necessary to develop and bring to
market the allegedly infringing product, and it had at least some say
in the decision to continue exploiting a longstanding distribution
channel [with Home Depot] that inexorably deposits a significant
number of the products at issue in Illinois [given Home Depot’s sev-
enty-six stores in the state].111
Further, the foreign parent’s “knowledge of the regular flow of prod-
ucts into Illinois cannot seriously be questioned, given [its] requests
for and receipt of regular sales updates.”112 Nonetheless, without ac-
tual evidence of in-state sales from which knowledge can be inferred,
courts may not be willing to assert personal jurisdiction over foreign
corporations even when their operations are interwoven with their
U.S. counterparts.113
107. Id.
108. Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Techtronic Indus. Co., Ltd., No. 16 C 6097, 2017 WL 3394741,
at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 8, 2017).
109. Id.
110. Id. at *1–2. Home Depot accounted for about half of the foreign parent’s global sales. Id.
at *2.
111. Id. at *5.
112. Id.
113. In Krausz Industries Ltd. v. Smith-Blair, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 3d 545 (E.D.N.C. 2016), for
example, Smith-Blair (a U.S. corporation) was the sub-sub-subsidiary of a Bermudian parent
corporation, while a factory in Shanghai that manufactured the accused product was owned by a
separate subsidiary (Sensus Shanghai) also multiple levels below the parent. Id. at 550. Nonethe-
less, Smith-Blair employees worked at the Shanghai facility and communicated regularly with
Sensus Shanghai employees regarding production of the infringing product, and some of the
employees at the Shanghai facility used “smith-blair.com” email addresses. Id. at 550–51. There
was also evidence that Smith-Blair had sales representatives assigned to North Carolina, sold the
products to distributors with locations in North Carolina, and maintained a website allowing
direct orders from consumers. Id. at 551. Nonetheless, the Eastern District of North Carolina
concluded it lacked personal jurisdiction over Sensus Shanghai because there was no evidence
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In continuing to assert specific jurisdiction over foreign corpora-
tions based on stream-of-commerce reasoning, the lower courts may
be ignoring signals from some members of the Supreme Court to treat
foreign defendants differently. That lack of distinction between for-
eign and U.S. defendants here seems justifiable, however, as the spe-
cial concerns of foreign defendants are already addressed through the
other half of the personal jurisdiction analysis—the application of the
reasonableness factors. Indeed, the lower courts have been willing to
invoke the reasonableness factors on behalf of (and perhaps only on
behalf of) foreign defendants.114 According to a recent survey under-
taken by Linda Silberman and Nathan Yaffe, both federal and state
courts pretty much never reject personal jurisdiction over U.S. de-
fendants based on reasonableness, but courts do—at least occasion-
ally—conclude that asserting personal jurisdiction over foreign
defendants would be unreasonable even though those defendants
have minimum contacts with the forum.115
Relying on the reasonableness factors to calibrate due process con-
cerns for foreign defendants is preferable to the alternatives. Making
the minimum contacts inquiry more demanding would also alter the
standard for U.S. defendants—a narrowing of personal jurisdiction
that would not be justified domestically. On the other hand, designing
a distinct minimum contacts test for “foreign” defendants would intro-
duce the definitional complications surveyed here. And relying on fo-
rum non conveniens to exclude cases against foreign defendants
allows for unnecessary subjectivity on the part of judges (given the
under-defined role of “foreignness” in forum non conveniens) and a
second “bite at the apple” on the part of defendants (given the incor-
poration of similar considerations within personal jurisdiction’s rea-
sonableness factors). In contrast, the existing two-step doctrine of
personal jurisdiction adequately addresses the due process concerns of
foreign defendants through use of a simple rule-like inquiry paired
with a calibrating set of factors that can account for individual context,
thus obviating the need for different tests that would require an ex
ante definition of “foreignness.”
that the accused products “actually entered North Carolina or that any of its products have been
found in North Carolina.” Id. at 555.
114. See, e.g., Delta Stone Prods. v. Xpertfreight, No. 2:16-cv-369-CW-EJF, 2017 WL 3491845,
at *7 (D. Utah Aug. 14, 2017) (recognizing a foreign insurance agency’s minimum contacts with a
U.S. state based on contractual language but finding personal jurisdiction nonetheless unreason-
able because, “[d]espite advances in transportation and communication, the record does not
support a finding that RSA travels to and/or operates in the United States to conduct economic
activity”).
115. Silberman & Yaffe, supra note 97, at 408.
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That said, it is still fairly rare for a court to determine that a foreign
defendant has minimum contacts with the forum but that the exercise
of jurisdiction over that foreign defendant would be unreasonable.116
What stands out in the analysis of reasonableness in this regard is the
courts’ ready invocation of “progress in communications and trans-
portation”117 and the availability of U.S. counsel118 as making litiga-
tion in the United States feasible for foreign defendants. Courts are
also solicitous of individual U.S. plaintiffs, who they worry may not be
able to pursue litigation in foreign courts.119 Those standard invoca-
tions in the personal jurisdiction context contrast with judges’ stan-
dard assessments regarding similar factors in the context of forum non
conveniens.120 There, judges often emphasize the cost and burden of
long-distance travel121 and have been willing to dismiss suits brought
by individual U.S. plaintiffs (often tourists harmed while on vacation)
despite the challenges they would face in pursuing their case in a for-
eign court.122
116. For example, Silberman and Yaffe conclude that courts do not dismiss on reasonableness
grounds when a U.S. plaintiff has brought a personal injury claim against a foreign defendant. Id.
at 415. While they report that almost nineteen percent of the cases they reviewed involving
foreign defendants were dismissed on reasonableness grounds (accounting for twenty-seven out
of eighty-eight cases), that figure includes an undisclosed number of cases where the court also
did not find minimum contacts to be established. See id. at 409 tbl.1, 413.
117. Seven Networks, LLC v. ZTE (USA), Inc., No. 3:17-cv-1495-M, 2018 WL 2427147, at *4
(N.D. Tex. May 30, 2018); see also Stephenson v. Caterpillar, No. 2:16-CV-00071-JRG-RSP, 2018
WL 6038359, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2018); Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Techtronic Indus. Co.,
Ltd., No. 16 C 6097, 2017 WL 3394741, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 8, 2017); Precision Orthopedic
Implants, Inc. v. Limacorporate S.P.A., No. 2:16-cv-02945-ODW, 2016 WL 7187299, at *9 (C.D.
Cal. Dec. 9, 2016) (in finding personal jurisdiction over a contract dispute, noting that “foreign
defendants, as a general matter, should not be immune from personal jurisdiction in a particular
forum merely because they reside abroad”).
118. See, e.g., Chamberlain Grp., 2017 WL 3394741, at *7; Stephenson, 2018 WL 6038359, at
*4.
119. Silberman & Yaffe, supra note 97, at 421 (citing Pro Axess, Inc. v. Orlux Distrib., Inc.,
428 F.3d 1270, 1281 (10th Cir. 2005); Pope v. Elabo GmbH, 588 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1021 (D. Minn.
2008)).
120. On the similarities between forum non conveniens analysis and the reasonableness fac-
tors for specific personal jurisdiction, see for example Gardner, supra note 83, at 434 &
nn.246–48 (gathering sources).
121. See, e.g., Palacios v. The Coca-Cola Co., 757 F. Supp. 2d 347, 352–53 (S.D.N.Y. 2010),
aff’d, 499 F. App’x 54 (2d Cir. 2012) (taking “cost considerations” into account); Del Istmo
Assurance Corp., No. 11-61599-CIV, 2011 WL 5508641, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 9, 2011) (“Even if
witnesses consented to appear before this Court, their travel arrangements would be costly.”).
122. See, e.g., Estate of Thomson v. Toyota Motor Corp. Worldwide, 545 F.3d 357, 367 (6th
Cir. 2008); Harp v. Airblue Ltd., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1074–76 (C.D. Cal. 2012); Lynch v. Hilton
Worldwide, Inc., No. 11-1362, 2011 WL 5240730, at *8 (D.N.J. Oct. 30, 2011). But see Reid-
Walen v. Hansen, 933 F.2d 1390, 1398 (8th Cir. 1991) (flagging that courts should be sensitive to
sending plaintiffs to litigate in foreign forums).
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It is possible that this different assessment of the burden of long-
distance litigation could be explained by procedural posture or con-
text. The reasonableness factors, after all, are a constitutional inquiry
while forum non conveniens is a purely discretionary determina-
tion.123 But the advances of modernity that have made it easier for
foreign defendants to appear before U.S. courts are relevant to
whether transnational cases can be efficiently litigated in those same
courts.124
C. Conduct
Finally, there is the question of determining the “foreignness” of a
course of conduct. What makes conduct “foreign” differs by doctrine:
forum non conveniens suggests a center of gravity test; the presump-
tion against extraterritoriality turns on a single connecting factor; and
the Alien Tort Statute arguably uses a threshold approach. The first
two of these approaches are unnecessarily binary, suggesting there is a
single best “home” for a dispute. But for most transnational cases, all
of the relevant conduct will not occur in a single country; put another
way, multiple countries may have a legitimate nexus to the conduct
and resulting dispute. For this reason, a threshold approach—like that
suggested by Kiobel’s “touch and concern” test—seems the most
pragmatic. Such an approach would ask not where a dispute best be-
longs, but whether it is sufficiently domestic to be litigated here (even
if it might also be litigated elsewhere).
Consider first the public and private interest factors weighed in a
forum non conveniens analysis.125 Many of these factors encourage
judges to hypothesize a “home” for the case: judges are to weigh, for
123. My personal view is that the gap between constitutional and statutory authority to exer-
cise jurisdiction, on the one hand, and judicial discretion to decline jurisdiction, on the other,
should be fairly narrow—and that current forum non conveniens practice sweeps more broadly
than is warranted. See Gardner, supra note 83; see also Maggie Gardner, Abstention at the Bor-
der, 105 VA. L. REV. 63 (2019) (arguing for narrowed and better-specified grounds of abstention
in transnational cases).
124. For forum non conveniens analyses that do take into account the increasing efficiency in
transportation and communication, see for example Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 911 F.3d
1172, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“Digitization . . . has eased the burden of transcontinental document
production and has increasingly become the norm in global litigation.”); Reid-Walen, 933 F.3d at
1397 (“[T]he time and expense of obtaining the presence or testimony of foreign witnesses is
greatly reduced by commonplace modes of communication and travel.”); Bohn v. Bartels, 620 F.
Supp. 2d 418, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
125. The private interest factors include the “relative ease of access to sources of proof; avail-
ability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of
willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises . . . ; and all other practical problems that make
trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508
(1947). The public interest factors include:
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example, “the local interest in having localized controversies decided
at home,” the undue burden of jury duty on a community “which has
no relation to the litigation,” and the preference for trial “in a forum
that is at home with the . . . aw that must govern the case.”126 To the
extent a case does not feel at “home” here, these factors suggest
judges should dismiss the case on the understanding that it will be
more at “home” elsewhere. In Piper, after all, the only possible alter-
native forum was Scotland.127 But as some judges have acknowledged,
many transnational cases are not centered in any one jurisdiction—
they may not be any more at “home” elsewhere.128 Put another way, a
transnational case may not have a clear geographic center of gravity.
Yet the forum non conveniens analysis, by suggesting that cases do
have one clear home, can lead to the dismissal of cases considered too
inconvenient to litigate in the United States that may be no easier to
litigate anywhere else.
The presumption against extraterritoriality—as developed in Morri-
son—defines a course of conduct’s “nationality” by the location of its
most critical component, or what the Court refers to as the “focus” of
the relevant federal statute. Whereas forum non conveniens encour-
ages a comparative analysis, in other words, the presumption against
extraterritoriality directs judges to identify a single connecting factor
and the geographic location where it was carried out.
Others have pointed out, however, that the formalism of the focus
test results in some unsatisfactory fictions.129 As Aaron Simowitz has
queried, can a statute have more than one “focus”? What if the “fo-
cus” is unlocatable—because, for example, it involves something in-
tangible? What if the statute’s “focus” was located in the United
[T]he administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; the ‘local interest in
having localized controversies decided at home’; the interest in having the trial of a
diversity case in a forum that is at home with the law that must govern the action; the
avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflict of laws, or in the application of foreign
law; and the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty.
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1981) (quoting Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 509).
126. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508–09.
127. Piper, 454 U.S. at 235.
128. For examples of decisions noting that a transnational case will be difficult and burden-
some to litigate no matter where it is tried, see Reid-Walen v. Hansen, 933 F.2d 1390, 1397 (8th
Cir. 1991); Cooper v. Tokyo Elec. Power Co., Inc., No. 12-CV-3032, 2014 WL 5465347, at *13–15
(S.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014); Baxter Int’l Inc. v. AXA Versicherung AG, 908 F. Supp. 2d 920, 926
(N.D. Ill. 2012).
129. The following examples are all developed at greater length in Aaron Simowitz, Extrater-
ritoriality in the Funhouse Mirror, 59 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). For a defense of the
current presumption against extraterritoriality, as set up in Morrison and RJR Nabisco, see Wil-
liam S. Dodge, The New Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 133 HARV. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2020).
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States, but the case still feels overwhelmingly (and problematically)
foreign?130 Ultimately, the focus test still views the world in binary
terms: The essence of a course of conduct is either domestic or it is
foreign. The terms have changed, but the insistence that disputes can
be neatly geographically allocated remains.
It is in this sense that the “touch and concern” language of Kiobel
may present a different—and more pragmatic—approach to identify-
ing the “nationality” of a course of conduct. Though the Supreme
Court did not elaborate at the time on what it meant by “touch and
concern,” the language could be interpreted as eschewing either the
comparative approach of Piper or the formalistic approach of Morri-
son.131 Rather than identify the singular “nationality” of the conduct,
in other words, the question whether claims “touch and concern” the
United States might ask instead whether the conduct is domestic
enough. Nonetheless, the inquiry requires further definition to avoid
the sort of subjective invocations of “foreignness” critiqued here: For
example, the U.S. conduct might need to be a proximate cause of the
injury or satisfy an element of the claim. Allegations that U.S. defend-
ants knowingly enabled, profited from, or covered up in the United
States the infliction of injury in another country might thus sufficiently
“touch and concern the territory of the United States,”132 even if such
claims also touch and concern other countries.
Over time, however, and especially following the Supreme Court’s
decision in RJR Nabisco, some of the federal circuit courts have amal-
gamated Kiobel’s “touch and concern” language with Morrison’s fo-
cus test.133 Justice Alito in his Kiobel concurrence asserted that the
focus test would require conduct sufficient to violate the law of na-
tions to have occurred within the United States.134 That approach
again tries to divide the world into here and everywhere else.135 Such
a binary view of the world does not always match up with the interna-
tional law violation alleged, which may be inherently transnational.
130. The Second Circuit confronted this last question in Parkcentral Global Hub Ltd. v.
Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2014).
131. See Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 527–29 (4th Cir. 2014); see also
Doe v. Drummond Co., Inc., 782 F.3d 576, 586 (11th Cir. 2015) (emphasizing the Supreme Court
left open in Kiobel what “touch and concern” means).
132. Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 528–31.
133. Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Because RJR Nabisco has
indicated that the two-step framework is required in the context of ATS claims, we apply it
here.”); Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, 845 F.3d 184, 194 (5th Cir. 2017) (“RJR Nabisco
makes clear that Morrison’s ‘focus’ test still governs” ATS cases); see also Drummond, 782 F.3d
at 590–91 & nn.20–21; Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 183–85 (2d Cir. 2014).
134. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 126–27 (2013) (Alito, J., concurring).
135. See Swaine, supra note 90, at 24, 42.
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For example, how does one traffic human beings (or anything else)
without engaging in conduct in multiple countries?136
Some circuits have thus spoken in terms of Morrison’s “focus,” but
nonetheless recognized that something less than all conduct establish-
ing the violation needs to have occurred in the United States.137 That
intermediate approach at least recognizes that the concept of “focus”
in Morrison was circumscribed: Requiring all of the elements of an
international law violation to occur within the United States would
greatly expand Morrison’s treatment of a statute’s focus as pertaining
to a discrete fact or element. Still, this intermediate position remains
unsatisfying. Trying to squeeze “touch and concern” into the “focus”
language of RJR Nabisco involves metaphysical gymnastics that are
removed from the historical intent of the First Congress, as well as the
realities of the interconnected global economy and the transnational
nature of many (if not most) international law violations.138
Nor is there any requirement that the focus test be read into Ki-
obel’s “touch and concern” language. Kiobel purposefully did not
adopt Morrison’s focus test.139 Lower courts have put much weight on
RJR Nabisco’s characterization of Kiobel as implicitly applying the fo-
cus test, but that language was dicta in a case that did not involve ATS
claims. Indeed, since RJR Nabisco, the Court has decided another
ATS case—and there the Court repeatedly referred to Kiobel’s “touch
and concern” standard while conspicuously avoiding the focus test.140
Though Jesner’s discussion of Kiobel was again dicta, its treatment of
Kiobel underscores that the sui generis ATS may require a more flexi-
ble approach.
That more flexible approach has much to commend it, even beyond
the ATS context. Asking whether a dispute “touches and concerns”
the United States might allow judges to evaluate the sufficiency of a
136. See Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 208–09 (Graves, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“The particular violation alleged here, human trafficking, is a transnational crime that uses a
global supply chain, which typically extends across multiple countries and requires an extensive
transnational network to succeed.”).
137. See Nestle, 906 F.3d at 1125–26 (“The focus of the ATS is not limited to principle of-
fenses.”); Drummond, 782 F.3d at 592 (“Displacement of the presumption will be warranted if
the claims have a U.S. focus and adequate relevant conduct occurs within the United States.”);
Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 186 (asking whether conduct which constitutes the international law viola-
tion “sufficiently ‘touches and concerns’ the territory of the United States”).
138. As Ed Swaine has pointed out, for example, strict application of Justice Alito’s Kiobel
concurrence would seem to exclude piracy from the scope of the ATS, even though the Supreme
Court considers piracy to be one of the quintessential international wrongs that the First Con-
gress had in mind when adopting the ATS. Swaine, supra note 90, at 38, 43.
139. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013).
140. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1406 (2018).
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dispute’s U.S. nexus without having to decide if that nexus is greater
or lesser than the dispute’s nexus with other countries. Avoiding the
comparative question obviates the need for formalist fictions or all-or-
nothing divisions between the United States and everywhere else. In
light of the Supreme Court’s modern (re)turn to territoriality, a touch-
and-concern standard may provide a middle ground that prioritizes
territoriality without unduly reifying it.
III. “FOREIGNNESS” AS TROPE
Returning to the initial question, what does it mean to call a case
“foreign-cubed”? In the D.C. Circuit’s recent decision in Simon v. Re-
public of Hungary, the dissent opened with the assertion that “this
foreign-cubed case—involving wrongs committed by Hungarians
against Hungarians in Hungary—should be litigated in Hungary.”141
The majority painted a different picture: Fourteen survivors of the
Holocaust—none of whom still lived in or were citizens of Hungary,
and four of whom had become U.S. citizens—sought compensation
for expropriation of their property by Hungary’s state-owned railroad
company when they and their families were transported to concentra-
tion camps during the Second World War.142 Some of the evidence
was located in Hungary, but some of it was located at the United
States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C.143 Few po-
tential witnesses were still alive, and the panel majority asserted that
the defendant had identified none who were in Hungary.144
Different readers might look at this dispute and feel differently as
to where it should properly be litigated. But the label of “foreign-cu-
bed” does no analytical work here. Whether the plaintiffs were mean-
ingfully foreign, for example, depends on whether one evaluates them
collectively or individually, or currently or at the time the claims
arose. Instead, “foreign-cubed” serves as a rhetorical shorthand for
why the case does not belong in U.S. courts—an intuition that should
be identified and explained (as the dissent in Simon, to be fair, then
proceeded to do).145
For particular doctrines in particular ways, foreignness does matter.
But loose invocations of “foreignness” add little to judicial analysis
while excusing under-justified determinations. In the worst case, the
141. Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 911 F.3d 1172, 1190 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Katsas, J.,
dissenting).
142. Id. at 1175, 1178 (majority opinion).
143. Id. at 1186.
144. Id. at 1188.
145. Id. at 1190.
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rhetoric of “foreignness” serves as a signal to the reader about the
worth (or lack thereof) of the plaintiffs and their claims. “Foreigners”
do not belong in U.S. courts; “foreign” disputes do not implicate U.S.
interests. In an era when “foreignness” can justify the exclusion of
religious minorities, the separation of families, the belittlement of con-
gresswomen, and the internment of young children, invoking the trope
of “foreignness” carries moral weight. “Foreignness” should be
treated not as a self-evident conclusion, but as a doctrinally specific
question to be answered. There is no simple, objective line between
here and everywhere else, and suggesting that there is obscures the
degree to which we are connected—politically, economically, and
ethically—to the lives of others.
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